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ABSTRACT
The face of customer relationship management has shifted as business partners on both sides of the relationship deploy
technology to better manage relationships, streamline business processes and achieve integration. The phenomenon of captive
buyer and supplier relationships grounded in substantial unilateral monetary and organizational investments in achieving
business objectives contrast with strategic partnerships, which emerge through bilateral investments. The current research
examines buyer/supplier relationship dyads finding that buyers’ trust has a direct effect on the occurrence of captive buyer
relationships; moreover, captive buyer and supplier relationships have a direct effect on each parties’ respective perceived
benefits. More importantly, each partners’ trust has a direct effect upon the occurrence of strategic partnerships, which in turn
has a direct effect on perceptions of derived benefits for each.
Keywords
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INTRODUCTION
Organizations making unilateral investments in achieving objectives create captive buyer and supplier relationships, while
bilateral investments result in strategic partnerships (Bensaou 1999). Digital technologies possess the ability to manage
relationships, streamline business processes and integrate partners (Grover et al. 2004; Straub et al. 2004; Tapscott et al.
2000). The current study focuses on the question of whether both buyer and supplier trust shape the development of captive
buyer and supplier relationships as well as strategic partnerships. Moreover, this work examines whether or not such
relationships yield greater perceived benefits for parties involved. Employing data on buyer/supplier relationship dyads, this
research examines the role of each partners’ trust in determining the nature of their relationships, in addition to the extent to
which subsequent relationships yield perceived benefits across participants.
The next section reviews the theoretical background relevant to the study and proposes specific research hypotheses. The
following section details the methodology including measurement development, survey protocols, validity assessment, and
data analysis. The final sections respectively discuss the findings and conclude the paper.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
The relational view of the firm proposes ways in which organizations overcome core constraints with respect to resources,
knowledge stocks and capabilities (Dyer et al. 1998). Specifically, firms differ in their investments in relationship specific
assets in accordance with the notion of asset specificity advanced in transaction cost economic theory (Williamson 1989).
Prior research examines key factors present in strategic alliances, concluding that they ultimately shape the specific nature of
subsequent relationships (Gulati 1998). In examining supply chain relationships within the U.S. and Japanese automobile
industries, effective management of product and market conditions dictates relationship choice (Bensaou 1999). Additionally,
an examination of marketing relationships provides a typology of potential relationships (spot, commodity, project, and
customer integration) based on relationship intensity and degree of customization (Kleinaltenkamp et al. 2002). By contrast
the current study seeks to understand the relationship between trust and the presence of captive buyer and supplier
relationships and strategic partnerships as well as the subsequent perceived benefits realized by each party.
Asset Specificity
From an economic perspective the presence, perceived or real, of “switching costs” allows for an operationalization of
buyer/supplier relationship dependence, or the degree to which one party relies upon another for the ongoing fulfillment of
recurring transactions (Klemperer 1987a; Klemperer 1987b; Lipman et al. 2000; Nilssen 1992). Continued participation with
minimal or no costs acknowledged exemplifies low switching costs. By contrast, faced with significant costs in discontinuing
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recurring interactions, high switching costs exist. Hence, such costs measure each party’s level of investment in the business
relationship (Nooteboom 1996).
The concept of asset specificity from transaction cost economics theoretically defines relationship investment (Williamson
1989). Asset specificity considers the degree to which a tangible or intangible asset holds value within a specific domain or
environment and loses some or all of that value in a different domain or environment (Whyte 1994). Investments, whether
physical or human, dedicated to a specific partner can entail considerable switching costs to firms through redeployment.
Asset specificity increases dependence on partners and serves to escalate the transaction cost economic situation (Ganesan
1994). Transaction specific assets dedicated to specific relationships hold minimal or no value outside of the relationship
(Lohtia et al. 1994; Williamson 1989). Not limited to physical assets, transaction specific investments can include training
and experience (Anderson et al. 1986).
Figure 1. Relationship Specific Investments
Similarly, within the context of buyer/supplier relationships, non-specific asset investments by both parties yield market
exchanges (Bensaou 1999), as depicted in Figure 1. Captive supplier relationships arise where non-specific assets exist on the
buyer side and highly specific assets exist on the supplier side. Given these conditions the supplier might be subject to sunk
costs as a result of substantial investments in developing processes for a buyer who could easily change providers at any time
(Dasgupta et al. 1993; Roodhooft et al. 1999; Worthington 1995). Likewise, captive buyer relationships emerge when clients
make highly specific asset investments while the supplier invests in non-specific assets. Under such circumstances buyers
might be subject to a lack of control within the relationship as the supplier could change or discontinue existing processes
forcing buyers to adjust. Finally, where both parties invest in highly specific assets, strategic relationships emerge.
Prior research on asset specificity finds embeddedness within buyer/supplier networks influence asset specificity in driving
opportunistic behaviors on the part of individual suppliers (Provan 1993). EDI furthers market coordination by reducing asset
specificity and freeing up partners (Prosser et al. 1997). The concept of information specificity, borrowing from the original
economic concept, examines the allocation of environmental scanning resources within organizations (Choudhury et al.
1997). In computing the transaction cost for products on the Web uncertainty and asset specificity play a greater role than for
traditional retail products (Liang et al. 1998). Implementation of specific assets effects manufacturer/supplier relationships
(Joshi et al. 1999a; Joshi et al. 1999b), and transaction specific assets mitigate opportunism in marketing channels (Brown et
al. 2000).
The current research operationalizes captive buyer and supplier relationships as well as strategic partnerships through each
party’s relationship specific investments and subsequent asymmetry/symmetry between parties’ investments, as depicted in
Figure 2. This study examines the effects of buyer and supplier trust on captive buyer and supplier relationships and strategic
partnerships, as well as the type of relationships’ effect on both buyer and supplier perceived benefits.
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Figure 2. Research Hypotheses
Trust
Trust influences cooperation and teamwork within organizations (Jones et al. 1998); moreover, alliance arrangements require
an adequate level of confidence in partners’ cooperative behavior (Das et al. 1998). “Trust beliefs” include benevolence,
competence, honesty and predictability, in addition to “institutional based trust” beliefs, situational normality and structural
assurance, as determinants (McKnight et al. 1998). Based on an integrated model of organizational trust (Mayer et al. 1995),
three characteristics of trust (ability, benevolence, and integrity) appear in existing literature and provide a basis for
evaluating trust in conjunction with institutional based beliefs (McKnight et al. 1998).
In considering these dimensions, “situational normality beliefs” include situations or settings where conditions should in all
likelihood yield a successful interaction between the parties involved (McKnight et al. 1998). By contrast, “structural
assurance beliefs” speak to the existence of safeguards; such as regulations, guarantees, and legal resources; that often
manifest themselves in initial relationship development. Consistent with the integrated model of organizational trust (Mayer
et al. 1995), ability constitutes a set of skills, competencies, and/or characteristics that enable either party to exert influence
within some specific domain of expertise. Benevolence entails the belief that either party acts in a positive manner with
regard to their interactions with the other party, excluding egocentric profit considerations. Finally, integrity considers either
party’s perception of the other’s devotion to a set of generally accepted principles.
Research Hypotheses
H1. Buyers’ trust will have a positive direct effect on the presence of captive buyer relationships.
H2. The presence of captive buyer relationships will have a positive direct effect on buyers’ perceived benefits.
H3. Suppliers’ trust will have a positive direct effect on the presence of captive supplier relationships.
H4. The presence of captive supplier relationships will have a positive direct effect on suppliers’ perceived benefits.
H5. Buyers’ trust will have a positive direct effect on the presence of strategic partnerships.
H6. Suppliers’ trust will have a positive direct effect on the presence of strategic partnerships.
H7. Strategic partnerships will have a positive direct effect on buyers’ perceived benefits.
H8. The presence of strategic partnerships will have a positive direct effect on suppliers’ perceived benefits.
Table 1. Research Hypotheses
The current study proposes that buyer and/or supplier trust impacts the subsequent type of relationship that emerges within
recurring supply chain interactions. In turn, these relationships whether captive buyer/supplier or strategic partnerships
impact parties’ perceptions of benefits derived. Consistent with the model detailed in Figure 2 and hypotheses stated in Table
1, this research posits that buyer trust will positively effect the emergence of captive buyer relationships that will in turn
impact perceived benefits realized, as stated in Hypotheses 1 and 2 respectively. Hypotheses 3 and 4 state, suppliers see a
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similar emergence of captive supplier relationships, which yield increased perceived benefits. Most important this research
examines whether both buyer and supplier trust shapes the development of strategic relationships and do such relationships
influence higher perceived benefits for both parties. Accordingly, Hypotheses 5 and 6 explore the impact of buyer and
supplier trust on the presence of strategic relationships. Finally, hypotheses 7 and 8 examine the direct effect of strategic
relationships on higher levels of buyer and supplier perceived benefits.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This study comprised two parts, an exploratory and confirmatory phase. During the exploratory phase, both buyers and
suppliers provided input on the development of a survey instrument used in the subsequent confirmatory phase (Creswell
1994; Kaplan et al. 1988; Mason 1996; Stone 1978).
In pursuit of this study, the investigation of inter-firm relationships dictates dyadic research designs, where the relationship
constitutes the focal unit of analysis (Anderson et al. 1994; Chen et al. 2004; Clemons et al. 1993; Dyer 1996). Traditionally,
practical difficulties often associated with such research designs lead to collection, or subsequent examination, of data on
only one side of the relationship.
A worldwide logistics supply chain service provider headquartered in the southeastern U.S. served as the research site for this
study. The firm’s clients represent a broad spectrum of industries, employing strategic IT-related supply chain products and
services supported by technically trained account managers. Vendor account managers and designated client contacts engage
in recurring interactions, providing for a setting well suited to studying inter-firm relationships. This research focuses on the
electronic commerce market segment, as buyers and suppliers routinely interact on IT-related products and services beyond
basic package delivery. Vendor account managers and their counterparts at respective client firms ultimately completed the
survey.
Qualitative Analysis
The initial exploratory phase employed a case study technique (Yin 1994). The analysis included historical and archival data
specific to the vendor site along with comparative data pertinent to the logistics industry as a whole. Data included annual
reports, published case studies, marketing material, press releases, and commercial news reports. Given the richness of this
comparative industry and vendor data, multiple interviews employing an open ended interview technique generated
additional background data from the vendor and its clients (Yin 1994). Length constraints of this report preclude a more
detailed discussion of these efforts.
Measurement Development
Based upon information obtained through interviews, this study adopted an eleven item scale of omnibus measures of trust
(McKnight et al. 2002). The researcher developed and validated a three item scale of omnibus measures and eight item
subjective measures for perceived benefits. These include eight specific performance outcomes, namely, improved asset
management, improved capacity planning, improved resource control, increased flexibility, increased productivity, lower
operating costs, and reduced workflow.
Matched dyadic measures of buyers’ and suppliers’ investments in developing the relationship serve to operationalize the
type of relationship; captive buyer, captive supplier, or strategic partnership. The researcher developed a three item scale of
omnibus measures for relational asset specific investment. Measures focus on the financial costs and physical effort expended
in developing the existing relationship that would be lost switching vendors. Measurement of relationship investment for the
parties employs a summated index of the level, li, of each item, xi, that belongs to the set of items, x1, x2, … xn. In a technique
previous employed (Straub et al. 2004), the summated index yields measures of symmetry, or asymmetry. As depicted in
Figure 2, averaging the summated buyer measure of investment and asymmetry between parties defines captive buyer
relationships, with captive supplier relationships derived in the same manner. Averaging the summated buyer and supplier
measures of relationship investment with symmetry defines strategic relationships.
Survey Procedures
Final survey administration occurred utilizing a commercial Internet survey site. Employing a previously used survey
strategy for gathering dyadic data (Dyer 1996), a senior executive within the marketing organization contacted a total of 183
of  the  supplier’s account  managers  via  email  on  behalf  of  the  researcher.  URLs to  the  buyer  and supplier  versions  of  the
Internet surveys and respective passwords accompanied the instructions. Only the respective account managers knew the
identity of the individual client firm consistent with confidentiality policies. In total 132 of the 183 account managers
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responded to the survey for a response rate of 72 percent on the supplier side of the survey. On the buyer side, some 91 of the
183 client contacts responded for a response rate of 49 percent. Response rates using the respective dyadic survey strategy
saw comparable results (Dyer 1996). Ultimately, the collective responses yielded 91 usable dyads.
Analysis of Non-response Bias
The vendor firm’s participation in the study precluded direct contact with client firms in an effort to assess potential non-
response bias. Comparing construct means between the early wave of respondents and those who responded during the fourth
and final week of data collection assessed any potential bias. This wave technique treats late respondents as a proxy for non-
respondents (Bailey 1978). Exactly 43 of the 183, or 22.9 percent, of the total respondents completed the survey during the
latter  period.  ANOVAs  for  waves  in  their  primary  industry,  primary  location  by  region,  number  of  employees,  and
relationship longevity, as well as the individual respondent’s gender, years of overall work, relationship management, and IT
experience detected no significant differences.
Analysis and Results
A two phased quantitative analysis includes measurement validation and hypothesis testing. The validation phase assesses the
reliability and validity of constructs, while the hypothesis-testing phase analyzes outlined hypotheses. The research model
calls for examining relationships between latent variables and accommodating the presence of multiple interdependent
relationships within the model. Hence, the analysis employs a form of Structural Equation Modeling (SEM), Partial Least
Squares (PLS). PLS allows for concurrent examination of measurement and structural models (Barclay et al. 1995; Chin
1998; Sambamurthy et al. 1994). In the measurement model, indicator weights and loadings provide proof of the strengths of
measures. While in the structural model, estimated path coefficients reflect the strength and sign of hypothesized
relationships (Igbaria et al. 1995).
Assessing the convergent and discriminant validity of the measures necessitates the implementation of different validation
techniques, due to the presence of both formative and reflective constructs. Formative measures include buyer and supplier
perceived benefits, while reflective measures include buyer and supplier trust, relationship investment as well as investment
symmetry/asymmetry. The measurement model assesses instrument validity within PLS, allowing for assessment of the
relationship between the observed, or indicator, variables (Igbaria et al. 1995).
Reliability Assessment
Cronbach’s a’s in excess of 0.7 serve as the commonly accepted standard for evaluating the reliability of scales (Nunnally et
al. 1994). Moreover, this 0.7 standard also allows for assessing adequacy of Composite Reliability scores (Fornell et al.
1981). Average Variance Extracted (AVE) measures the percentage of overall variance in indicators captured by latent
constructs through the ratio of the sum of captured variance and measurement error (Hair et al. 1998). In assessing the AVEs
of all constructs, 0.5 serves as the commonly accepted standard (Fornell et al. 1981).
The Cronbach’s a’s for reflective measures all exceed the prescribed 0.7 threshold (Nunnally et al. 1994), as detailed in
Table 2. Additionally, all of the outer model loadings for items exceed 0.7 (Fornell et al. 1981). Moreover, the magnitudes of
the square root of the AVEs exceed 0.8, converging toward 1 (Fornell et al. 1981).
Matrix of Intercorrelations and
Square Root of AVEs*# ofItems
Composite
Reliability
Cronbach
a’s 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
1. Buyer Trust 11 0.752 0.927 0.872*
2. Supplier Trust 11 0.851 0.961 0.308 0.921*
3. Buyer Investment 3 0.696 0.909 0.317 0.109 0.920*
4. Supplier Investment 3 0.815 0.911 0.332 0.186 0.864 0.923*
5. Buyer Performance 8 0.855 0.965 0.054 0.174 0.350 0.149 0.861*
6. Supplier Performance 8 0.778 0.915 0.399 0.254 0.259 0.432 0.004 0.893*
Table 2. Reliability and Validity Analysis
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Discriminant Validity
The AVEs and intercorrelations among measures serve as a means for assessing the discriminant validity, or extent to which
indicators differentiate among constructs. Adequate discriminant validity exists when the square root of the AVE of a
measure exceeds the correlations between individual measures and all other measures (Gefen et al. 2000). As reported in
Table 2, intercorrelations and square roots of AVEs reflect no discriminant validity issues.
The AVE analysis assumes reflective measures. An alternate assessment of discriminant and convergent validity calls for a
variation (Loch et al. 2003) of the multitrait-multimethod (MTMM) analysis (Campbell et al. 1959). In testing formative
constructs, items correlate with a “global item that summarizes the essence of the construct (p. 272),” employing an
established formula (Diamantopoulos et al. 2001). An alternate version of this technique uses the product of normalized item
scores and their PLS weights to derive a weighted item score (Ravichandran et al. 2000). The summated weighted scores for
items that measure the same construct yield a composite score for the construct (Bagozzi et al. 1982). An item-to-construct
correlation matrix compares weighted item and composite construct scores.
Using both approaches items should correlate more highly with each other than with measures of other constructs and with
their own composite constructs. Hence, no significant discriminant validity issues exist. For comparison purposes, the
analysis includes variables not specific to the constructs within the study typically demographic variables. These variables
should bear no significant correlation with study constructs. Few exceptions to inter-item and item-to-construct correlations
exist. Specifically, the number of employees correlates with two of the eleven buyer trust items at a significant level,
although low compared with item-to-item and item-to-construct correlations. Normal statistical distributions in large matrices
can result in not necessarily meaningful exceptions (Campbell et al. 1959). Ultimately, construct validity conclusions lie in
overall patterns. The sizes of the resulting matrices preclude inclusion in this report.
Convergent Validity
In assessing convergent validity, measures believed to be part of the same construct correlate at a significant level with one
another (Campbell et al. 1959). Significance of individual measure correlations with weighted composite constructs uses
composite scores for each construct and original items. Each construct should only include items where the respective
measaure explains 50 percent of their variance (Fornell et al. 1981). Loadings in excess of 0.7 provide evidence of
convergent validity (Fornell et al. 1981). Moreover, measures thought to be part of same construct correlate highly at a
significant level with one another. Significance at a 0.01 level for all dependent and independent variables’ item-to-construct
correlations indicate no convergent validity issues with measures in the current study.
Hypothesis Testing
* t < 0.001, ** t < 0.01
Figure 3. Hypotheses Testing Analysis
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SEM techniques evaluate the explanatory power of the proposed model and significant paths, or hypothesized relationships,
among unobservable variables, or latent constructs (Igbaria et al. 1995). The analysis treats captive buyer and supplier
relationships and strategic partnerships as three independent models, yielding independent R2s. As depicted in Figure 3, buyer
trust has a significant direct effect on the occurrence of captive buyer situations, supporting Hypothesis 1. Moreover, the
analysis detects significant direct effects between captive buyers and buyers’ perceived benefits, Hypothesis 2. In analyzing
captive supplier relationships, Hypothesis 3, not supported by the analysis, examines direct effects between supplier trust and
captive supplier relationships. The analysis supports Hypothesis 4, with significance detected along the captive supplier and
supplier perceived benefits path. Central to this research, analysis with respect to strategic partnerships detects significant
positive effects for both buyer and supplier trust on strategic partnerships, supporting Hypotheses 5 and 6, as well as strategic
partnerships on both parties’ perceived benefits, supporting Hypotheses 7 and 8.
DISCUSSION
Grounded in substantial unilateral financial and organizational investments, captive buyer and supplier relationships seek to
achieve business objectives (Bensaou 1999). This study finds significant direct effect between buyers’ trust and the presence
of captive buyer relationships, in addition to such relationships and buyers’ perceived benefits. Trust in respective supply
chain partners influences buyer willingness to make financial investments in addition to dedicating time and resources.
Moreover, buyers derive performance benefits from unilateral asset specific investments.
With respect to captive supplier relationships, no significant direct effects exist between supplier trust and the occurrence
captive supplier relationships. However, such relationships have a positive direct effect on suppliers’ perceived benefits.
Trust in respective clients does not appear to drive supplier investments in time, money, and resources developing
relationships. However, higher occurrences of captive supplier relationships realize increased performance results, justifying
investments. Antecedents to unilateral supplier investments do not include trust; however, investments yield higher benefits.
Predicated on mutual investments of participating parties, strategic partnerships aim to achieve goals of all participants
(Bensaou 1999). Here, this study finds that both parties’ trust in the other has a positive direct effect on the occurrence of
strategic relationships. Moreover, strategic partnerships have a positive effect on both higher buyer and supplier perceptions
of realized benefits. Clearly strategic partnerships require mutual trust in achieving bilateral investment, in addition to
delivering mutual returns.
CONCLUSION
This study examines buyer/supplier relationship dyads finding that buyers’ trust has a positive effect on the occurrence of
captive buyer relationships, which in turn have a direct effect on buyers’ perceived benefits. Captive supplier relationships
have a positive direct effect on suppliers’ perceived benefits. More importantly, this research finds that both buyers’ and
suppliers’ trust influence the occurrence of strategic partnerships, and such partnerships yield derived benefits for both
parties.
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